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Abstract
One of the most consistent findings in the literature on teacher quality is that teachers im-
prove with experience, especially in the first several years. This study extends this research by
separately identifying the effect of general teaching experience and grade-specific experience.
Using within-teacher variation, I find that both general experience and grade-specific experi-
ence improve teacher performance. For math scores, the magnitude implies that teachers who
always repeat grade assignments improve approximately 35% faster than teachers who never
repeat grade assignments. In addition to furthering our understanding of how teachers improve
with experience, this paper contributes to a literature on task-specific human capital.
∗I would like to thank Ron Ehrenberg, Kirabo Jackson, Jordan Matsudaira, Doug Webber, Ken Whelan, James
Cowan and Carrie Ost for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Also, I am indebted to the North Carolina Education
Research Data Center for making available the confidential data used in this study.
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1 Introduction
Like many professions, successful teaching requires a variety of skills and knowledge. For ex-
ample, the skill set of a good fourth-grade elementary school teacher includes pedagogical knowl-
edge, fourth grade curriculum familiarity, classroommanagement skills, and communication skills.
The economic literature on teacher human capital acquisition has found compelling evidence that
teachers improve with experience; however, which skills develop with experience and which skills
are most important for effective teaching have not been investigated. This paper contributes to
our understanding of teacher improvement by separately identifying the importance of acquiring
course-specific human capital and general teaching human capital. Course-specific human capi-
tal encompasses areas like lesson planning and curriculum familiarity, whereas general teaching
human capital includes skills applicable to teaching any course.
To address this question, I use administrative matched teacher-student data that follows each
teacher in the North Carolina public school system from 1995-2007. Results from a value-added
model show that teachers improve with experience and the magnitude of these improvements de-
pends upon the frequency with which they are able to apply both general and grade-specific hu-
man capital.1 In my preferred specification which includes teacher-by-school fixed effects, grade-
specific experience is found to be approximately one third as important as general experience for
benefiting student math scores. There is little evidence that grade-specific experience benefits
students’ reading scores. Controlling for the level of grade-specific experience, general teaching
experience benefits both math and reading scores.
While this paper is the first to examine specific and general experience in the context of teach-
ing, several studies have attempted to separately identify task-specific experience from general
experience. The major advantage of the present paper is the ability to control not only for firm and
year fixed effects, but also individual worker fixed effects. In addition, unlike the firm/industry ef-
1Value-added models rely on there being no systematic student sorting according to the teacher characteristic of
interest. While previous research such as Rothstein (Forthcoming) and Clotfelter et al. (2006) show evidence of
students sorting into classrooms, I find little evidence that this sorting is systematically related to experience within a
teacher. I explore these issues in detail in the falsification section.
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fects literature, the changes in task assignment that I exploit are extremely common and I provide
evidence that phenomena such as Ashenfelter dips do not occur prior to a grade re-assignment.
Furthermore, because teachers frequently change grade assignments, I am able to control for both
the act of switching itself as well as the number of switches each teacher has experienced. My
preferred estimates are thus identified off of the specific pattern and order in which grades are
taught.
This study’s contributions are threefold. First, it provides direct empirical evidence that within
an occupation, task-specific human capital acquisition can significantly affect productivity. Sec-
ond, it provides some evidence as to which skills teacher professional development programs
should focus on. Lastly, the results of this paper can guide policy regarding teacher grade as-
signments.
2 Literature
2.1 Task-Specific Human Capital
While there is a wealth of empirical literature devoted to examining the relative importance of
firm-specific and general human capital, relatively little research has empirically analyzed the role
of task-specific human capital in wage formation. In a theoretical paper on task-specific human
capital, Gibbons and Waldman (2004) explain that “some of the human capital an individual ac-
quires on the job is specific to the tasks being performed, as opposed to being specific to the firm”
(p. 203). They argue that task-specific human capital has broad applicability compared to firm-
or industry-specific human capital and task-specific human capital can theoretically explain phe-
nomena such as cohort effects, job design, and promotion patterns. Unfortunately, relatively few
empirical studies have examined the role of task-specific human capital, possibly because most
longitudinal data lacks descriptions of job tasks.
In a recent paper, Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2007) examine worker transition using a panel
dataset of German workers combined with a cross-sectional survey of job tasks. Matching each
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occupation to one of three “task requirements” they find that task-specific tenure can account for
between 25-40% of wage growth. Since their paper assumes that within an occupation tasks are
uniform, the analysis is restricted to observing individuals who change jobs. The essence of the
identification is comparing individuals who move to a job with a new set of task requirements to
individuals who move to a job with similar task requirements as their previous employment. The
authors note, however, that a potential drawback to this approach is the possibility of unobserved
differences between workers who move to a similar occupation and workers who move to a dissim-
ilar occupation. A major advantage of Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2007) over my paper, however,
is that the authors examine a representative sample of occupations whereas this paper is limited to
teachers.
Another study analyzes the role of task-specific familiarity in the context of financial analyst
forecasting performance (Clement et al., 2007). Unlike Gathmann and Scho¨nberg, this paper uses
cross sectional analysis and tests whether analysts with more experience analyzing firm restructur-
ings are more accurate in analyzing future restructurings than are other analysts. This paper has
the advantage of examining a narrowly defined type of specific experience and using a direct mea-
sure of productivity; however, because the data used is cross-sectional, unobserved heterogeneity
across analysts cannot be ruled out. Importantly, the results found in this study may be driven by
differential attrition among analysts.2
My paper is similar to Clement et al. (2007) in that my analysis is restricted to a single occu-
pation and a narrowly defined “specific experience.” Also, I observe productivity directly rather
than assuming wages are equal to marginal product. Given the strong theoretical justification for
a divergence between wages and marginal products over the life course (Lazear, 1979) observing
productivity is a more direct test of the role of specific human capital. Unlike Clement et al. (2007),
however, my data is longitudinal and thus I am able to control for unobserved time-invariant het-
erogeneity.
2If analysts that perform poorly on their first firm-restructuring assignment are fired, then currently employed ana-
lysts with previous experience are likely better on average than currently employed analysts with no firm-restructuring
experience.
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2.2 Teacher Experience
While the impact of many teacher characteristics is still debated, there exists an emerging con-
sensus that teacher experience positively contributes to student learning. In a meta-analysis of the
value-added literature, Harris (2008) finds that eight of nine studies that use value-added models
show evidence of teachers improving with experience.
However, the only paper of which I am aware that explores a mechanism for how teachers
improve is Jackson and Bruegmann (2009). The authors show that teachers improve when exposed
to higher quality peers, thus demonstrating that part of teacher improvement is based on learning
from other teachers. My paper builds on this research by identifying the type of skills that are most
important to learn.
3 Data
I use longitudinal administrative data that links students to their teachers in the state of North
Carolina between 1995-2007.3 This data includes detailed information on student, classroom,
teacher, and school characteristics as well as a standardized measure of math and reading achieve-
ment for students in grades three through eight. For each student, the data include race, gender,
parental education, free or reduced lunch status, and test scores for each grade. Available teacher
characteristics include gender, race, highest degree earned, years of teaching experience, under-
graduate institution, and licensure test scores.4 Years of teaching experience is based on the num-
ber of years credited to a teacher for the purposes of salary calculation and thus should reflect all
experience in any district.
By matching teacher information to classroom records, I am able to identify the grade taught
by each teacher in each year. Using this information I construct a variable indicating the number
of years a teacher has previously taught her current grade assignment. Because middle and high
3This data has been extensively cleaned and standardized by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center
housed at Duke University.
4This data is described in great detail in Clotfelter et al. (2007).
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school teachers often teach multiple grades simultaneously, and because student test score data is
most complete for third through fifth grade, I restrict my sample to elementary teachers who teach
self-contained single-grade classes.
While the North Carolina data includes a link between student test scores and teachers, the
teacher listed is actually the proctor of the student exam, not necessarily the classroom teacher.
For elementary classrooms, the proctor is likely to be the classroom teacher, but to improve the
accuracy of teacher-student matches, I limit the sample to confidently matched students. Following
Clotfelter et al. (2007), Rothstein (Forthcoming), and Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) I consider
a proctor to be the classroom teacher so long as the teacher’s grade assignment matches the grade
of the proctored exam. In addition, I drop cases where a proctor administered more than half of
his/her tests to a different grade level.5
To ensure comparability across years, I standardize all test scores by grade and year.6 In order
to implement some econometric specifications, I require a lagged test score in addition to current
test scores. Students who are only present in the data for a single year are therefore dropped.
The exception is for third graders, since the lagged third grade test is actually given to students
at the beginning of the third grade rather than in second grade. While the data includes complete
teacher data starting from 1995, complete student data is only available starting in 1997. I use the
1995-1996 period to calculate grade-specific experience, but only use 1997-2007 in regressions.
As discussed by Koedel and Betts (2008), achievement tests that contain ceilings may lead to
systematic measurement error since students near the ceiling are unable to make further gains. I
test for a ceiling in the North Carolina data by comparing a kernel density of each distribution to
that of the normal density. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that there is little reason to be concerned
with ceiling effects for these tests.
5In describing this data, Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) note that “According to state regulation, the tests must be
administered by a teacher, principal, or guidance counselor. Discussions with education officials in North Carolina
indicate that tests are always administered by the students’ own teachers when these teachers are present. Also, all
students in the same grade take the exam at the same time; thus, any teacher teaching a given subject in a given grade
will almost certainly be administering the exam only to her own students.” Given these procedures, it is unlikely that
a teacher assigned to teach a given grade would proctor an exam for other students in the same grade.
6Standardization is made prior to any data restrictions and thus the mean and standard deviation of the analysis
sample is not exactly zero and one respectively.
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3.1 Data Limitation: Grade-Specific Experience
The data include information on teaching experience accrued before the sample period; however,
my measure of grade-specific experience is limited to the sample time frame. For example, a
teacher with ten years experience in 2003 accrued the latter eight years during the sample frame,
but the data provides no information regarding the grades she taught in her first two years (1993-
1994). Thus, I cannot exactly determine this teacher’s grade-specific experience for any year. In
general, I cannot exactly calculate grade-specific experience for teachers who have pre-sample
experience.
I address this data limitation with two distinct approaches. The first approach simply restricts
the data to teachers who began teaching during the sample period and whose grade assignments are
thus fully observed. The second approach uses all teachers for analysis and imputes grade-specific
experience accrued prior to the sample period. This imputation is implemented by assuming that
the histogram of grades a teacher taught out-of-sample matches the average histogram of grades
taught by other teachers in his or her school. Each approach has benefits and drawbacks. Re-
stricting the sample to fully observed teachers leads to an unrepresentitively inexperienced sample,
while imputing grade-specific experience leads to measurement error in an explanatory variable.
Because the measurement error introduced is not necessarily classical however, the measurement
error may bias estimates and it is difficult to assess its direction and magnitude.
Given that imputation may lead to biased estimates, my preferred specification restricts the
sample to fully observed teachers.7 The fact that this sample of teachers is unusually inexperienced
is likely a minor issue since previous research has found that most improvement occurs during the
first several years (Rivkin et al., 2005).
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for both the full sample and the sample which is restricted
to fully observed teachers. As can be seen from this table, the restricted sample has considerably
less experience on average than the full sample.8 In addition, 25.6% of the full sample of teachers
7While my preferred specifications restrict the sample to fully observed teachers, results based on the full sample
are very similar and are shown in the appendix.
8The substantial difference in average experience is not surprising. By definition, teachers in the restricted sam-
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have an advanced degree whereas only 13.1% of the restricted sample of teachers have an advanced
degree. The upper panel of Table 1 shows that restricting the sample to relatively inexperienced
teachers also leads to a slightly different sample of students. Students in the restricted sample
perform worse than students in the full sample and these students are also more likely to be a
minority. These differences reflect that fact that schools with weaker, minority students, have rela-
tively high teacher turnover rates and thus are disproportionately staffed by recently hired teachers.
While the restricted sample of teachers is clearly not representative of teachers as a whole, it is the
complete universe of recently hired teachers in the state of North Carolina and thus interesting in
and of itself. The next section provides a more nuanced description of the relationship between
grade-specific experience and general experience in this sample.
4 General Experience vs Grade-Specific Experience
In the absence of grade assignment changes, experience and grade-specific experience would be
perfectly collinear and I would only be able to identify a single effect. To investigate the prevalence
of grade assignment changes, Table 2 presents a transition matrix showing grade assignments in
year t+1 as a function of grade assignment in year t. This table demonstrates that approximately
30 percent of teachers switch grade assignments after teaching third, fourth or fifth grade. This
table also documents that teachers are much more likely to switch to adjacent grades than distant
grades.9
The frequent switching documented in Table 2 leads to a substantial divergence between expe-
rience and grade-specific experience. Table 3 presents a cross tabulation of grade-specific experi-
ence and experience. Approximately a third of teachers teach a new grade in their second year of
teaching, and less than a third teach the same grade five times in their first five years teaching. This
pattern continues in later years and suggests that it is possible to separately identify grade-specific
ple must have less than 13 years of experience whereas the full sample includes many teachers with 30+ years of
experience.
9Evaluating whether experience in adjacent grades is more beneficial than experience in distant grades is hindered
by the fact that relatively few teachers acquire experience in distant grades.
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and general experience for this sample.
4.1 Grade-Specific Experience and Student Performance
As a preliminary analysis of the effect of grade-specific experience, I perform simple mean com-
parisons of average student performance. Figure 3 graphically shows changes in average student
test score gains as grade-specific experience varies. Each panel in this figure holds absolute years
of experience constant and graphs the average student test score gains for teachers with various
levels of grade-specific experience. These figures show that teachers with more grade-specific
experience perform better in terms of their students’ test score gains.
This relationship is especially clear for lower experience levels and is more pronounced for
math score gains than reading score gains. While these figures are suggestive, they simply reflect
raw correlations and by themselves cannot be interpreted as implying a causal relationship. How-
ever, in a later section I obtain a more controlled estimate of the impact of grade-specific experience
which confirms the implications of the simple average comparisons.
5 Identification Strategy
When using teacher fixed effects, the effect of grade-specific experience is identified by two
different sources of variation. First, grade-specific experience diverges from general experience
whenever a teacher receives a new grade assignment. Second, conditional on the number of times
a teacher switches grades, grade-specific experience varies depending on the pattern of grades
taught and the order in which these grades are taught.
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5.1 Test for Systematic Grade Switching
Since one source of variation is based on grade switching, estimates which use this source of
variation may be biased if teacher switching is correlated with expected performance.10 If teachers
are switched to grades in which they have less experience in years when one expects that they will
do particularly poorly, this may lead to overstating the importance of grade-specific experience.
To test whether teacher switching is related to expected performance, I estimate equations (1) and
(2). Since it is impossible to directly measure “expected” performance, I test whether current
performance predicts whether a teacher is switched the following year.11
1(gj,t = gj,t+1) = λ
￿
g
￿￿￿Ngs(t+1) −Ngs(t)￿￿￿+ ζA¯jtgtstt + βEjt + ωjs + ξg + φt + ￿jt (1)
1(gj,t = gj,t+1) = λ
￿
g
￿￿￿Ngs(t+1) −Ngs(t)￿￿￿+ ζ∆Ajtgtstt + βEjt + ωjs + ξg + φt + ￿jt (2)
The variable 1(gj,t = gj,t+1) is an indicator that is unity when teacher j repeats grade as-
signments and zero when teacher j switches grade assignments. The variable A¯jgst denotes the
average test scores for students taught by teacher j in grade g in school s in time t.12 The vec-
tor Ejt includes experience and grade-specific experience in period t. Both specifications include
teacher-by-school, grade, and year fixed effects denoted by ωjs, ξg and φt respectively. The coeffi-
cient λ captures the impact of school-by-year changes in the demand for teachers of each grade.13
10More exactly, estimates may be biased if teacher switching is correlated with expected performance conditional
on all observables.
11Since principals might consider raw test scores in addition to test score progress, I define performance as absolute
test score in equation (1) and as test score gains in equation (2). I use a linear probability model (LPM) to predict
whether a teacher switches grade assignments between years. This model is run as a linear probability model rather
than a non-linear model for simplicity and because empirically, predicted probabilities all lie between zero and one
using the LPM.
12These regressions are run at the classroom level because the tests aim to capture principals’ responses to class
performance. When the same regressions are estimated at the student level, the results are similar but the magnitudes
of the estimates are considerably smaller.
13Hoxby (2000) exploits population variation to identify the effect of class size on student achievement. Similarly,
population variation leads to changes in the number of classes per grade. When a particularly large cohort of stu-
dents passes through a school, teachers may need to be switched around each year in order to create extra sections
for the large cohort. The variable Ngs(t) denotes the number of sections of grade g in school s in time t. Thus,￿
g
￿￿￿Ngs(t+1) −Ngs(t)￿￿￿ gives the total number of section changes in a school for a given year. I include this variable
because as the number of section changes increase, I expect that teachers are more likely to switch grades to fill those
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In performing this test, I am primarily interested in the coefficient ζ because this coefficient reflects
the extent to which teachers are switched due to their current students’ performance.14
As can be seen in the first two columns of Table 4, there is weak evidence that teachers are
switched based on current performance. A one standard deviation improvement in average reading
test gains leads to a 0.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of being switched. There
is a small negative effect from math gains as well; however this is not statistically significant.
The level of average reading scores and math scores are not statistically significant predictors of
teacher switching. Although the evidence of systematic teacher switching is rather weak, I cannot
conclude that estimates identified from teacher switches will be completely free of bias.
5.2 Test for Systematic Changes in Grade-Specific Experience
The second (and more exact) source of identifying variation is based upon the magnitude of
grade-specific experience changes. For example, when a teacher switches grade assignments,
this generally leads to a decrease in grade-specific experience; however, grade-specific experience
sometimes increases as a result of a switch.15 When controlling for both whether a teacher switches
and current grade-specific experience, estimates will be biased if next year’s grade-specific expe-
rience is correlated with expected performance. I test for this correlation by examining whether
current teacher performance predicts next year’s grade-specific experience. It should be empha-
sized that this test cannot detect correlations between grade-specific experience and expected per-
formance that are unrelated to current performance. I estimate:
EXPGRDj,t+1 = γA¯jtgtstt + βEjt + ωjs + ξg + φt + ￿jt (3)
EXPGRDj,t+1 = γ∆Ajtgtstt + βEjt + ωjs + ξg + φt + ￿jt (4)
empty positions.
14If one teacher switches grades, another teacher will possibly need to switch grades as well, thus standard errors
are clustered at the school-year level. In practice, using OLS standard errors or other clustering levels lead to similar
results.
15In my data, 13.45% of switches result in increases in grade-specific experience.
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The variable EXPGRDt+1 denotes the grade-specific experience for teacher j in time t + 1 and
all other variables are defined as in (1) and (2). As shown in the third and fourth column of Table
4 there is little evidence that grade-specific experience changes are related to current performance.
Because there is some evidence that teacher switches are correlated with performance, my empir-
ical model controls both for switching last period and the total number of switches a teacher has
experienced. Based on the above tests, I conclude that conditional on these switches, the resulting
grade-specific experience variation is not systematically related to previous teacher performance.
6 Empirical Model
To evaluate the impact of teacher characteristics on student outcomes I use a value-added model
(VAM) that controls for student characteristics, teacher characteristics, and several fixed effects to
predict future test scores. My preferred specification controls for the lag of test score; however, I
explore the robustness of results across other value-added models in the appendix.16
Aijgst = αAijt−1gt−1st−1,t−1 + βXi + δCijgst + ρVij
+ πDjt + f(Expjt) + g(Expgrdjt) + ξg + ωjs + φt + ￿ijgst
(5)
Aijgst is the test score of student i taught by teacher j in grade g in school s in time t. The student
characteristic vector Xi includes student gender, ethnicity, subsidized lunch status, and parental
education. Classroom characteristics such as class size and average peer characteristics (excluding
student i) are denoted by Cijgst. The vector Vij includes interactions between the student and
teacher ethnicity and sex.17 The vector Djt includes a control for whether the teacher switched in
the previous period and the total number of past switches a teacher has experienced. This model
includes grade, teacher-by-school and year fixed effects denoted by ξg, ωjs and φt respectively.
16The lagged test score VAM is used in many recent studies including Aaronson et al. (2007), Kane et al. (2006),
Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), and others. Controlling for the lag of test score is found to outperform other value-
added methodologies in an experimental validation study by Kane and Staiger (2008). In their paper Kain and Staiger
find no evidence that non-experimental value-added estimates are biased, relative to experimental estimates.
17Dee (2005) shows that gender and ethnicity match may effect student achievement.
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Experience and grade-specific experience enter through f(·) and g(·). While some past studies
have controlled for national board certification status, I do not control for this variable because
national board certification itself may reflect teacher quality gained from experience.
As has been noted in previous research, measurement error in lagged test scores can bias es-
timates on all coefficients. I follow the procedure suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and
Todd and Wolpin (2003) and use the second lagged test score as an instrument for the first lagged
test score. Generally, this IV specification would drop any student who lacks three consecutive
test scores leading to an unrepresentative sample that disproportionately represents students in rel-
atively stable situations. I use the estimator proposed by Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) which
avoids this significant data restriction. Essentially the Jackson and Bruegmann estimator uses the
restricted student sample to estimate α using the double lag as an instrument for the lag of test
score. The estimate of α is then used in estimating equation (5) for the entire sample.18
While Rothstein (Forthcoming) demonstrates significant non-random sorting of students into
classrooms, this will only bias my results to the extent that this sorting is correlated with grade-
specific teacher experience within a teacher. Furthermore, because I control for absolute years of
teaching experience, estimates of the impact of grade-specific experience will only be biased if stu-
dents are sorted into classrooms depending on the teachers’ grade-specific experience conditional
on a fixed level of overall teaching experience. I explore these concerns in the falsification section
and find little evidence that within a teacher, students are differentially sorted as the teacher gains
experience or grade-specific experience.
Following Rockoff (2004), Aaronson et al. (2007), Koedel and Betts (2007), and others, I
model experience effects as a cubic polynomial. Given the nearly perfect collinearity between
general experience and year effects when teacher fixed effects are included, it is necessary to
assume that teacher experience has no impact on quality after a certain threshold of experience.
As in Rockoff (2004), Harris and Sass (2007), and Koedel and Betts (2007) I use 10 years as the
cutoff for general experience.19
18See the online appendix of Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) for a proof of the consistency of this estimator.
19See Rockoff (2004) for a discussion and justification of this assumption. In practice, this assumption is imple-
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7 Results
Results from the above specification are shown in Table 5 and Table A-1. Consistent with
previous research, a teacher’s experience is found to positively impact student outcomes. While
controlling for number of years of teaching (general experience), grade-specific experience also
has a positive impact on student math scores.
Based on the restricted sample with teacher-by-school fixed effects, estimates for math scores
imply that a teacher who teaches the same grade for each of her first five years helps students
perform 0.137 standard deviations better than students with a novice teacher. If, instead, a teacher
teaches different grades every year for her first five years, she helps students perform 0.0985 stan-
dard deviations better than a novice teacher. In other words, a teacher who always repeats grade-
assignments improves 39% more than a teacher who never repeats grade assignments. Estimates
based on the full sample are similar, and are shown in the appendix.
Based on the restricted sample there is no statistically significant effect of grade-specific ex-
perience on reading scores. Estimates based on the full sample, however, show small statistically
significant benefits of grade-specific experience for reading scores. However, as is shown in Table
(A-4), the results for reading scores are somewhat sensitive to the exact value-added model chosen,
so I am hesitant to conclude that grade-specific experience benefits reading scores. While I have
no definitive explanation as to why grade-specific experience matters for math but not reading, one
possible cause is the fact that similar reading skills are taught in each grade whereas math curricula
change dramatically for each grade.20
To examine the entire experience profile, Figure 4 and Figure 5 plot predicted outcomes for
teachers as they gain experience. These figures graphically present the functions shown in the first
mented by recoding the experience variable so that teachers with above ten years of experience are made to have
exactly ten years of experience. In the unrestricted sample, this recoding leads to grade-specific experience exceeding
general experience for the approximately 2% of teacher-year observations that have grade-specific experience above
10 years. By definition, experience must be greater or equal than grade-specific experience so I impose a cutoff of 10
years on grade-specific experience as well.
20The North Carolina standard curriculum “five competency goals” demonstrate this point. Between third and fifth
grades, all five reading competency goals remain identical for each grade whereas all five math competency goals
change for each grade (North Carolina Department of Education, 2009).
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and fourth columns of Table 5.21 For math scores, the experience profile is concave, increasing
for both grade-specific experience and general experience. The effect of grade-specific experience
ranges from 30-40% of the general experience effect depending on the experience level. As was
previously discussed, reading scores improve with teacher general experience but not with grade-
specific experience.
The second, third, fifth and sixth columns of Table 5 show that results are similar when us-
ing school fixed effects or teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects. The model with school fixed
effects has the advantage of utilizing a larger amount of variation to identify the grade-specific ex-
perience effect, since teachers who never switch grades still contribute to these estimates. Unfor-
tunately, this model may be biased if teachers have inherent traits that make them both frequently
switched and inherently weak or strong teachers. Furthermore, differential attrition may lead to
unobserved differences between experienced and inexperienced teachers.22
Models with teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects have the advantage of controlling for
unobserved differences in a teacher’s inherent ability to teach different grades; however, these
estimates are identified only for teachers who switch grades and then switch back to their original
grade.23 Since only 7.48% of teachers switch grades and then switch back, estimates that include
teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects are identified from a relatively small fraction of teachers.
Given that results are qualitatively similar when including school, teacher-by-school, or teacher-
by-school-by-grade fixed effects, it appears that the exact source of identifying variation is rela-
tively unimportant. That being said, my preferred specification includes teacher-by-school fixed
effects because it controls for possibly important unobserved heterogeneity without severely re-
stricting the identifying sample.
21Standard error bands are calculated using the formula V ar(aE + bE2 + cE3) = E2V ar(a) + E4V ar(b) +
E6V ar(c)+2E3Cov(a, b)+2E4Cov(a, c)+2E5Cov(b, c). This formula explains why bands “fan out” and become
large for high levels of experience. The larger standard errors for higher levels of experience is fairly mechanical and
is not due to small number of observations for higher levels of experience.
22Hanushek et al. (2005), Boyd et al. (2008), and Goldhaber et al. (2007) all find evidence that less effective teachers
are more likely to leave a school.
23When a teacher switches away from a grade and later returns, grade-specific experience is not colinear with general
experience within a teacher-grade. If a teacher only teaches grades in continuous runs, experience and grade-specific
experience are always perfectly colinear within each teacher-grade.
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8 Falsification
A major concern in using value-added models to measure teacher productivity is the extent to
which students are non-randomly assigned to teachers. Importantly, the non-random assignment
of students to teachers is necessary but not sufficient to bias estimates of experience effects. In
order for non-random student assignment to bias experience effects, student assignment must be
systematically related to teacher experience within a teacher. Just as random student assignment
is sufficient for eliminating bias in the presence of non-random teacher placement, randomly as-
signing teachers (according to their experience) is sufficient for eliminating biased estimates of
experience effects, in the presence of non-random student sorting.
Rothstein (Forthcoming) provides evidence that students are non-randomly assigned to teach-
ers; however, since I include teacher-fixed effects, bias is only created if students are sorted dif-
ferentially over a teacher’s tenure. In addition, as demonstrated by Rothstein (2009), the lagged
test score model that I use has the advantage that it can account for dynamic systematic sorting
based on observable past student performance. Specifications that include student-fixed effects
and exclude the lagged score are unable to control for dynamic student sorting.
With this type of bias in mind, I test for systematic assignment based on grade-specific ex-
perience. Following Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), I test for this type of bias by examining
whether a future teacher’s experience is correlated with current student outcomes, conditional on
observables. While I confirm Rothstein’s finding that a student’s future teacher appears to have an
“effect” on current performance, I find weak evidence that this non-random sorting is related to
grade-specific experience.24
Table 6 shows the results of a regression in which the experience levels of each student’s future
teacher is included in the regression given by equation (5). This regression examines whether a
student’s future teacher’s experience levels are correlated with a student’s current performance,
conditional on observables. As can be seen in this table, there is limited evidence of non-random
24This indicates that my estimates of grade-specific experience effects are likely not affected by non-random sorting,
but individual teacher fixed effects should not be relied upon to evaluate that specific teacher’s effectiveness.
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sorting based on teacher grade-specific experience. One specification shows that teachers are given
students with slightly better reading scores as they gain grade-specific experience, but this result is
not robust across models. Given 36 coefficient estimates, finding one to be marginally significant
could easily be due to random chance.
Because of the nature of the falsification exercise, students must be observed in three consec-
utive years to be included in the regression. This restriction leads to a considerable sample size
reduction which lowers the power of these regressions. It is possible that estimates given in Table 6
would be statistically significant if the sample size was equivalent to Table 5. As shown in the ap-
pendix, when using the full sample of teachers (with grade-specific experience imputations), there
is some evidence that students are sorted according to a teacher’s general experience level for math
scores. Regardless, the magnitudes of these false experience “effects” are quite small compared to
the estimates given in Table 5. Based on this rather weak evidence of student sorting, I conclude
that it is unlikely that previous estimates are substantially biased due to student sorting.
9 Conclusion
The fact that teachers improve with experience is commonly cited as one reason why teacher at-
trition is problematic. This paper shows that reassigning a teacher to a new grade has consequences
similar to teacher attrition because his or her grade-specific human capital is wasted. While it is
very difficult and expensive to affect teacher attrition through policy, improving teacher grade
assignments is more straightforward to implement. Based on conversations with principals and
teachers, it is apparent that completely avoiding grade assignment switches is unrealistic. Teach-
ers are sometimes switched due to changes in enrollment, personality clashes amongst teachers
in a grade, or when a teacher is perceived to feel “too comfortable” with their current grade. In
cases where grade reassignments are unavoidable, however, principals should consider providing
teachers who are new to their grade assignment many of the supports provided to teachers who are
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generally inexperienced.25
More generally, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that the applicability of human
capital is directly related to the similarity between past and future tasks performed. Thus, in
analyzing the effect of worker movement, the most relevant question may not be whether the
worker moves to the same industry or firm, but rather whether the new job requires similar tasks to
the old. Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2007) provide some evidence of the importance of task-specific
human capital in the context of job changes, but this literature remains under developed.
Given that teachers gain both general and grade-specific human capital, principals should make
a concerted effort to increase the frequency with which teachers are able to repeat grade assign-
ments, especially in the first few years of teaching. Approximately one third of teachers in my
sample teach two different grades in their first two years and I see little theoretical or empirical
justification for these assignments. Given the political and financial costs of most reforms aimed at
improving educational outcomes, education policy makers should take advantage of the relatively
easy and cheap efficiency gain of giving teachers repeat grade assignments.
25A small percentage of schools have consciously decided to frequently change grade assignments based on their
belief that grade-specific human capital is less important than student-teacher relationships that develop over the course
of a year. These schools have teachers “follow” their students and therefore teacher grade assignments change incre-
mentally each year. While one could theoretically evaluate the effectiveness of such an approach, in practice, too few
students in North Carolina are exposed to this system. In the student-teacher matched sample, fewer than 0.1 percent
of students who were in the sample from third to fifth grade had the same teacher all three years.
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Tables, Figures and Appendix
Figure 1: Distribution of Math Scores
Figure 2: Distribution of Reading Scores
Figure 3: Average student test score gains by teacher grade specific experience: Split by experi-
ence level.
Notes: As experience rises, the number of teachers reflected in each point sharply decreases and
thus the plots become increasingly noisy. For example, there are relatively few teachers with
exactly 8 years of experience and exactly 6 years of grade-specific experience.
Figure 4: Return to Experience – Math Scores
(a) Grade-specific Experience (b) General Experience
Figure 5: Return to Experience – Reading Scores
(a) Grade-specific Experience (b) General Experience
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample Restricted Sample
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Observations Mean Standard deviation
Unit of observation: Student-year
Math Score 2188251 0.041 0.99 688962 -0.02 0.984
Reading Score 2178575 0.037 0.988 685667 -0.03 0.988
Change in math score 1840340 0.026 0.704 562480 0.011 0.733
Change in reading score 1832654 0.014 0.732 560052 -0.006 0.764
Female 2189917 0.495 0.5 689539 0.495 0.5
Black 2189917 0.284 0.451 689539 0.302 0.459
Hispanic 2189917 0.055 0.228 689539 0.068 0.252
Parent is high school dropout 2189917 0.094 0.291 689539 0.082 0.274
Parent is high school graduate 2189917 0.560 0.496 689539 0.542 0.498
Parent is college graduate 2189917 0.236 0.425 689539 0.221 0.415
Class size 2189917 22.909 3.313 689539 22.525 3.362
Student has limited english proficiency 2189917 0.019 0.137 689539 0.022 0.146
Unit of observation: Teacher-year
Experience 100681 12.051 9.585 32306 2.911 2.715
Grade-specific experience (No Imputation) - - - 32306 1.842 2.109
Grade-specific experience (Imputed) 100681 5.685 3.935 - - -
Female Teacher 100681 0.928 0.259 32306 0.878 0.327
Black Teacher 100681 0.138 0.345 32306 0.113 0.317
Hispanic Teacher 100681 0.003 0.059 32306 0.005 0.068
Teacher has advanced degree 100681 0.256 0.436 32306 0.131 0.338
Teacher Exam Score 93993 0.039 0.835 29913 0.152 0.702
Table 2: Grade Assignment Transition Matrix
Grade taught in year t+1
Grade taught
in year t PK K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 and up Total
PK 80.8% 11.2% 2.9% 1.9% 1.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 100.0%
K 1.2% 76.7% 10.4% 4.0% 2.6% 1.7% 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 100.0%
1 0.4% 10.2% 72.3% 8.5% 3.5% 2.0% 1.4% 0.8% 0.8% 100.0%
2 0.3% 5.3% 8.8% 69.7% 9.2% 3.2% 2.1% 0.7% 0.7% 100.0%
3 0.2% 4.0% 4.5% 7.3% 69.6% 8.2% 3.7% 1.4% 1.1% 100.0%
4 0.2% 2.8% 2.9% 4.3% 7.8% 69.8% 8.9% 1.9% 1.5% 100.0%
5 0.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.7% 5.4% 8.4% 72.1% 4.3% 2.6% 100.0%
Note: This table is restricted to teachers who teach in both year t and t+1 and are fully observed in the
data.
Table 3: Grade Specific Experience by Total Experience
Grade Specific Experience
Experience 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100%
1 32.9% 67.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100%
2 24.1% 23.3% 52.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100%
3 20.2% 17.5% 19.2% 43.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100%
4 18.0% 14.5% 14.0% 16.6% 36.9% 0.0% 100%
5 16.1% 13.4% 11.9% 12.4% 15.6% 30.6% 100%
Note: This table includes all teachers in the fully observed sample.
Table 4: Test for Dynamic Endogeneity of Grade-Specific Experience
Restricted sample Full sample
Prob. teacher is switched Grade-specific exper. Prob. teacher is switched Grade-specific exper.
between year t and t+1 in year t+1 between year t and t+1 in year t+1
Average math score in year t -0.013 0.019 -0.006 0.013
(0.009) (0.028) (0.004) (0.015)
Average read score in year t 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.009) (0.028) (0.004) (0.014)
Average math gains in year t -0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.012
(0.006) (0.017) (0.002) (0.009)
Average read gains in year t -0.009† -0.009 -0.004* -0.010
(0.005) (0.016) (0.002) (0.008)
# of course offering changes 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.002*
between t and t+1 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Grade-specific exper. in year t 0.061** 0.061** 0.518** 0.542** 0.035** 0.035** 0.587** 0.602**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.034) (0.034) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.013)
General experience in year t -0.011 -0.012 0.387** 0.399** 0.004* 0.003† 0.120** 0.118**
(0.025) (0.022) (0.090) (0.079) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
Teacher was switched -1.931** -1.950** -2.102** -2.115**
between t and t+1 (0.077) (0.078) (0.049) (0.048)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect: Teacher-by-
School
Teacher-by-
School
Teacher-by-
School
Teacher-by-
School
Teacher-by-
School
Teacher-by-
School
Teacher-by-
School
Teacher-by-
School
Observations 18808 20226 18974 20409 67036 71364 67630 71987
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at the school-year are reported in parentheses
Notes: The observation is at the class level so test scores (and gains) are class averages. The results are nearly identical when estimated at the student level with standard errors
clustered at the class level. For the first two columns, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a teacher switches grades between year t and year t+1. For the third and
fourth columns the dependent variable is grade-specific experience in year t+1 Columns five through eight repeat the tests using the entire sample (with grade-specific experience
imputed).
Table 5: Impact of Teacher Experience on Student Performance
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade-specific experience 0.0162* 0.0307** 0.0360* -0.0054 0.0041 0.0129
(0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0163) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0159)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0022 -0.0056** -0.0029 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0010
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0023)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Experience 0.0492** 0.0386** 0.0346† 0.0646** 0.0320** 0.0557**
(0.0126) (0.0067) (0.0178) (0.0123) (0.0057) (0.0174)
Experience2 -0.0084** -0.0061** -0.0080** -0.0080** -0.0052** -0.0078**
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0020)
Experience3 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0003** 0.0005**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Student characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 562480 562480 562480 560052 560052 560052
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at class level
reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. Only teachers who begin teaching during the sample frame
are included in this regression. Appendix Table A-5 shows the complete set of coefficients from these
regressions.
Table 6: Falsification: “Impact” of Future Teacher Experience on Current Student Performance
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lead teacher grade exper. 0.0045 -0.0005 0.0050 0.0077 0.0062 0.0088†
(0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)2 -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0009
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)3 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Lead teacher exper. 0.0072 0.0087 0.0077 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0004
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0062)
(Lead teacher exper.)2 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0010
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
(Lead teacher exper.)3 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 261816 261816 261816 260743 260743 260743
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at class level
reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score in period t. Lead experience and lead grade-specific
experience correspond to the characteristics of student i’s teacher in period t+1. All period t
covariates are included in this regression.
Appendix
A Robustness Across Value Added Models
The lagged IV model used in the paper is my preferred specification both because it has per-
formed well in experimental validation studies and because it can control for student sorting so
long as that sorting is based on past test score. For robustness, I estimate other common VAMs
in this appendix. Using the same variable definitions as presented in the paper, three commonly
estimated VAM models are laid out below.
Gains model
∆Aijgst = βXi + δCijgst + ρVij + f(Expjt) + g(Expgrdjt)
+ πDjt + ξg + ωjs + φt + ￿ijgst
(6)
Lagged test score model
Aijgst = αAijt−1gt−1st−1,t−1 + βXi + δCijgst + ρVij
+ πDjt + f(Expjt) + g(Expgrdjt) + ξg + ωjs + φt + ￿ijgst
(7)
Student fixed-effect model
Aijgst = βXi + δCijgst + ρVij + f(Expjt) + g(Expgrdjt)
+ πDjt + ωjs + µi + φt + ￿ijgst
(8)
The lagged test score model is identical to the preferred specification from the text except that
it does not instrument for the lagged test score. This model assumes that all past inputs can be
summarized by the lagged test score and it implicitly assumes that the effects of past inputs decay
geometrically. The gains model additionally makes the assumption that α = 1. One advantage of
the gains model over the lagged model is that it completely avoids the measurement error problems
of including the lagged score as an independent variable.
The student fixed effects model controls for unobserved fixed characteristics of students and
assumes that past inputs have no effect on future outcomes. Unfortunately, given my data, the
model with student fixed effects may be unreliable when estimated for the fully observed, restricted
sample of teachers. This analysis is complicated by the fact that when I restrict the sample to fully
observed teachers, this severely reduces the number of students who are observed for two or more
years.26 As a result, while restricting the sample to fully observed teachers is broadly my preferred
specification, since it destroys the continuous panel structure along the student dimension, my
preferred student fixed effect estimates are based on the full sample of teachers.
Even when using the full sample of students however, one drawback to using the student fixed
effects model is that one cannot simultaneously control for grade fixed effects, year fixed effects
and student fixed effects (see Rockoff (2004) for a discussion). Previous research has simply
dropped the grade fixed effects; however, given that this paper’s focus is differences between
grades, the exclusion of grade fixed effects seems ill advised. Nevertheless, I report estimates
from the student-fixed effects model (excluding grade fixed effects) with the understanding that
the restricted sample estimates are identified off of very few students.
Estimates based on the above 3 models (as well as the preferred specification from the text) are
shown in Table A-3. Results are extremely similar for the lagged model, the instrumented lagged
model and the gains model. When including student fixed effects for the restricted sample, grade-
specific experience appears to be much more important and the impact of general experience is not
statistically significant. The differences in results for the student fixed effect model could be due to
the exclusion of grade fixed effects or the controls for unobserved fixed student ability; however, I
find it most likely that the differences are due to the lack of repetitive student observations because
when estimated on the full sample of teachers, the student fixed effect model yields similar results
to the other models. Table A-4 shows estimates of the same models for the full sample of teachers.
When using the entire sample, all four value-added models yield qualitatively similar results.
26If a student is observed for three years in the data, this student is only observed for three years in the restricted
sample if he/she has a fully observed teacher in every year. Only 16% of the students who are observed for three years
in the full sample, appear for three years in the restricted sample.
Table A-1: Impact of Teacher Experience on Student Performance - Full Sample
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade-specific experience 0.0155** 0.0269** 0.0228** 0.0058† 0.0140** 0.0096*
(0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0045)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0020** -0.0029** -0.0028** -0.0010 -0.0017** -0.0014†
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Experience 0.0322** 0.0288** 0.0249** 0.0179** 0.0186** 0.0166**
(0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0046)
Experience2 -0.0069** -0.0052** -0.0061** -0.0040** -0.0032** -0.0039**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Experience3 0.0004** 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Student characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1840340 1840340 1840340 1832654 1832654 1832654
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at class level
reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. Teachers with out-of-sample experience are included and the
distribution of grades taught out-of-sample is imputed as laid out in the text.
Table A-2: Falsification: “Impact” of Future Teacher Experience on Current Student Performance - Full
sample
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lead teacher grade exper. -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0048† 0.0030 0.0050†
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)3 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lead teacher exper. 0.0062* 0.0062† 0.0064* -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0012
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
(Lead teacher exper.)2 -0.0014* -0.0012 -0.0015* -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
(Lead teacher exper.)3 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 901578 901578 901578 898129 898129 898129
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at class level
reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score in period t. Lead experience and lead grade-specific
experience correspond to the characteristics of student i’s teacher in period t+1. All period t
covariates are included in this regression.
Table A-3: Robustness Across Value-Added Models
Math Reading
Student Student
Lagged Fixed Lagged Fixed
Model: IV Gains Lagged Effect IV Gains Lagged Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade-specific experience 0.0162* 0.0180** 0.0165* 0.0462** -0.0054 -0.0041 -0.0052 0.0031
(0.0080) (0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0060) (0.0072) (0.0086)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0022 -0.0030† -0.0023 -0.0081** 0.0016 0.0010 0.0015 0.0007
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0024)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Experience 0.0492** 0.0480** 0.0490** 0.0170 0.0646** 0.0592** 0.0637** 0.0601**
(0.0126) (0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0146) (0.0123) (0.0095) (0.0115) (0.0169)
Experience2 -0.0084** -0.0075** -0.0083** -0.0036* -0.0080** -0.0067** -0.0078** -0.0053*
(0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0021)
Experience3 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0002 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Student characteristics Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 562480 562480 562480 562480 560052 560052 560052 560052
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. Headings refer to model type. The Lagged IV model is the preferred specification used throughout the main text. The gains,
lagged and student fixed effect models correspond to equations 6, 7, and 8 respectively
Table A-4: Robustness Across Value-Added Models - Full Sample
Math Reading
Student Student
Lagged Fixed Lagged Fixed
Model: IV Gains Lagged Effect IV Gains Lagged Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade-specific experience 0.0155** 0.0145** 0.0153** 0.0246** 0.0058† 0.0037 0.0056† 0.0137**
(0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0024)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0020** -0.0015* -0.0019** -0.0025** -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0009†
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Experience 0.0322** 0.0368** 0.0329** 0.0358** 0.0179** 0.0227** 0.0185** 0.0232**
(0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0031)
Experience2 -0.0069** -0.0070** -0.0069** -0.0071** -0.0040** -0.0042** -0.0040** -0.0045**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Experience3 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Student characteristics Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1840340 1840340 1840340 1840340 1832654 1832654 1832654 1832654
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. Headings refer to model type. The Lagged IV model is the preferred specification used throughout the main text. The gains,
lagged and student fixed effect models correspond to equations 6, 7, and 8 respectively
Table A-5: Full Set of Coefficients from Table 5
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female student -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0036
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Black student -0.0198** -0.0206** -0.0197** -0.0438** -0.0386** -0.0378**
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Hispanic student 0.0183* 0.0223** 0.0233** -0.0059 -0.0039 -0.0025
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0077)
Parental education
High school dropout -0.0138** -0.0232** -0.0244** -0.0332** -0.0400** -0.0410**
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
College graduate 0.0086** 0.0179** 0.0190** 0.0014 0.0098** 0.0107**
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Student on subsidized lunch -0.0297** -0.0288** -0.0285** -0.0262** -0.0259** -0.0260**
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Limited english proficiency 0.1234** 0.1214** 0.1207** 0.1539** 0.1522** 0.1535**
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093)
Student-teacher same sex 0.0051† 0.0046 0.0049 -0.0073* -0.0070* -0.0069*
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Student-teacher same ethnicity -0.0052 0.0018 0.0007 0.0113† -0.0093 -0.0101
(0.0070) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0064) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Class size -0.0032** -0.0051** -0.0050** -0.0017** -0.0035** -0.0037**
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Teacher was switched this year 0.0200** 0.0135† 0.0173* 0.0009 0.0003 0.0048
(0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0065) (0.0076) (0.0081)
Total number of times switched -0.0186** 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0100** -0.0057 -0.0011
(0.0030) (0.0063) (0.0106) (0.0026) (0.0061) (0.0102)
Experience 0.0386** 0.0492** 0.0346† 0.0320** 0.0646** 0.0557**
(0.0067) (0.0126) (0.0178) (0.0057) (0.0123) (0.0174)
Experience2 -0.0061** -0.0084** -0.0080** -0.0052** -0.0080** -0.0078**
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0020)
Experience3 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0003** 0.0005** 0.0005**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Continued on next page
Table A-5: Continued from previous page
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
Grade-specific experience 0.0307** 0.0162* 0.0360* 0.0041 -0.0054 0.0129
(0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0163) (0.0062) (0.0076) (0.0159)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0056** -0.0022 -0.0029 -0.0006 0.0016 0.0010
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0023)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Peer Characteristics
Ave. Lagged math score -0.2581** -0.0314* 0.0243†
(0.0080) (0.0124) (0.0138)
Ave. Lagged read score -0.1575** 0.1057** 0.1671**
(0.0067) (0.0115) (0.0128)
Fraction female 0.0320† 0.0433* 0.0343† 0.0211 -0.0133 -0.0251
(0.0178) (0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0154) (0.0182) (0.0191)
Fraction black -0.2284** -0.0332 0.0043 -0.1066** 0.0936** 0.1292**
(0.0200) (0.0222) (0.0233) (0.0171) (0.0218) (0.0230)
Fraction hispanic -0.2102** -0.0827* -0.0594 -0.1988** -0.1070** -0.0730†
(0.0320) (0.0380) (0.0401) (0.0295) (0.0380) (0.0401)
Frac. parent ed: Dropout 0.0494** -0.0149 -0.0179 0.0418** 0.0253 0.0264
(0.0170) (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0149) (0.0199) (0.0209)
Frac. parent ed: College grad. 0.0102 0.0121 0.0060 -0.0058 -0.0106 -0.0183
(0.0124) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0110) (0.0142) (0.0150)
Frac. subsidized lunch -0.0832** 0.0098 0.0266* -0.0501** 0.0425** 0.0520**
(0.0109) (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0094) (0.0116) (0.0124)
Frac. limited english proficient 0.0738† 0.1625** 0.1564** 0.0709† 0.2479** 0.2920**
(0.0391) (0.0438) (0.0459) (0.0362) (0.0444) (0.0471)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Observations 562480 562480 562480 560052 560052 560052
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. This Table provides the full set of coefficients for the regressions
presented in Table 5
